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Abstract
Language form varies as a result of the information being communicated. Some of the ways in 
which it varies include word order, referential form, morphological marking, and prosody. The 
relevant categories of information include the way a word or its referent have been used in 
context, for example whether a particular referent has been previously mentioned or not, and 
whether it plays a topical role in the current utterance or discourse. We first provide a broad 
review of linguistic phenomena that are sensitive to information structure. We then discuss several 
theoretical approaches to explaining information structure: information status as a part of the 
grammar; information status as a representation of the speaker’s and listener’s knowledge of 
common ground and/or the knowledge state of other discourse participants; and the optimal 
systems approach. These disparate approaches reflect the fact that there is little consensus in the 
field about precisely which information status categories are relevant, or how they should be 
represented. We consider possibilities for future work to bring these lines of work together in 
explicit psycholinguistic models of how people encode information status and use it for language 
production and comprehension.
WHAT IS INFORMATION STRUCTURE?
People talk for a reason. They want to share news, connect with others, inform, amuse, or 
cause things to happen. Human languages are organized in ways that reflect the content and 
purpose of utterances – that is, the information that is contained in the words and structures 
that make up sentences. This organization is called information structure[1,2] or 
information packaging.[3] This article reviews how information structure constrains 
linguistic form, that is, the way people say things.
Information structure helps explain why people say things in different ways. Speakers 
constantly make choices about how to phrase their utterances. For example, a speaker might 
say The aardvark chased the squirrel, The squirrel was chased by the aardvark, or What 
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was chased by the aardvark was the squirrel. The squirrel may be referred to with a lengthy 
phrase (The furry-tailed creature who stole my crackers) or simply the pronoun it. While 
these variations could describe the same event, they are pragmatically felicitous (i.e. 
appropriate) in different contexts.
Language scholars agree that linguistic form varies as a function of informational 
considerations, including what the speaker is attending to, what the speaker wishes the 
addressee(s) to focus on, what is assumed to be already known, what is considered most 
important, or what is treated as background information. Yet the definition of information 
structure is notoriously variable across researchers and topics. Our review reflects this 
heterogeneity, and reports the definitions of information structure that are important for each 
phenomenon that we discuss. Nevertheless, two general approaches to information structure 
emerge. Many linguistic choices reflect a distinction between information that is given (i.e. 
previously known or discussed), and that which is new.[4] Other choices seem to reflect the 
distinction between the topic (i.e. information that is backgrounded or assumed) and the 
focus (i.e. that which is highlighted or focused). These distinctions establish the 
information status of a word or referent in the discourse.
In the first section of this paper, we provide an overview of what information structure is, 
and how it relates to four linguistic phenomena: 1) referential form, 2) morphology, 3) word 
order, and 4) prosody. In the second section, we consider how it relates to major theories 
about language structure, use, and processing. We then consider potential psychological 
mechanisms for representing information structure.
HOW INFORMATION STRUCTURE SHAPES LANGUAGE
Reference
Information structure has a strong effect on how people refer to entities in the world, 
including both introducing new entities into a discourse and referring back to already-
mentioned entities. This can affect multiple dimensions, including definiteness, pronoun use, 
and modification.
Many languages, including English, use different expressions for definite and indefinite 
information. For example, if the speaker has just been talking to someone about a particular 
dog, the speaker can refer to it with the definite expression the dog or perhaps even the 
pronoun it. However, if the dog is mentioned in the conversation for the first time, the 
speaker may use the indefinite expression a dog. In English, the definite article ‘the’ is 
traditionally regarded as indicating that the noun is specific and familiar to both the speaker 
and the hearer, by virtue of having already been mentioned in the discourse.[5,6]
However, the effects of information structure on reference are modulated by real-world 
knowledge and inferences. For example, definites are not restricted to cases where the 
referent is given. Consider a sentence such as I went to a wedding and the bride wore white, 
but unfortunately a guest spilled wine on her.[7] Here, a wedding is indefinite and being 
mentioned for the first time, the bride is definite although being mentioned for the first time 
(i.e. a novel definite), and a guest is indefinite and being mentioned for the first time. Novel 
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definites occur with entities that are familiar to all and known to be unique (e.g. the moon, 
the sky), as well as with unique entities whose existence can be inferred from mentioned 
entities (e.g., we can infer the bride from the wedding; Prince[4] uses the term ‘inferrable’). 
Due to this inference process, some novel definites can result in slowed comprehension.[8]
Information structure also guides the speaker’s selection of nouns, pronouns and other 
referring expressions. After mentioning a great new book, the speaker will probably use the 
pronoun ‘it’ to refer to the book in the immediately subsequent utterances. Use of pronouns 
provides an efficient, shorthand way of referring to already-mentioned, prominent referents 
and allows speakers to avoid excessive repetition. In fact, using a name when a pronoun 
would be sufficient has been shown to result in processing difficulties, at least under certain 
circumstances.[9] By contrast, introduction of a new referent requires fuller expressions, like 
a description (the donkey), possibly a modification (the scared donkey), or a name 
(Sylvester).
Many researchers agree that the choice of expression is determined by the salience, or 
accessibility of a referent in context. The more-reduced referring expressions (e.g. pronouns) 
are used to refer to more prominent/salient entities – i.e. those that are more activated or 
accessible in people’s minds at that point in the discourse – and fuller referring expressions 
(e.g. nouns) are used for entities that are less salient.[10,11] However, the definition of 
salience/accessibility is complex. Intuitively, referents become accessible when they are 
topical in the recent discourse – for example, when they have been recently mentioned, 
especially when they have been mentioned in syntactically prominent positions like the 
subject position.[5, 12, 13] Yet this effect is modulated by the grammatical position of the 
referring expression: pronouns in subject and object position tend to be interpreted as 
referring to previously-mentioned entities in the parallel syntactic position (e.g. preceding 
subject or object).[14] The interpretation of pronouns is also guided by the plausibility of 
potential referents, which is often connected to their thematic roles. One such effect is the 
implicit causality of an event, e.g. in The parrot blamed the tiger, because he…., 
comprehenders expect the pronoun to refer to the tiger.[15] Implicit causality and other 
effects of verb semantics are modulated by the coherence relation between the two clauses, 
for example whether the second clause communicates the cause (“…because…”) or 
something else.[52] It also appears that accessibility is not a single dimension, in that 
different kinds of referring expressions seem to be sensitive to different kinds of 
information. For example, Finnish is a language with flexible word order where humans can 
be referred to with demonstrative pronouns (‘this’) or personal pronouns (‘s/he’). In Finnish, 
demonstrative pronouns tend to be coreferential with post-verbal arguments (subjects or 
objects), which tend to be discourse-new. By contrast, personal pronouns exhibit a strong 
preference to be coreferential with syntactic subjects, regardless of their given/new status or 
sentence position.[16,17]
Morphological marking of information structure
Noun morphology—Many languages use morphological marking on nouns to indicate 
grammatical role. For example, in Japanese and Korean, subjects have the nominative 
marker –ga (Japanese) and –i/–ka (Korean), and direct objects are marked with accusative (–
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o in Japanese and – (l)ul in Korean). These languages also have an information-status 
marker that indicates the topic, namely – wa in Japanese and –(n)un in Korean,[18,19] 
which can occur on either subjects or objects. Both Japanese and Korean topic markers can 
occur on the topical entity, i.e. what the sentence is about. When the whole sentence is new 
information (e.g. the answer to “What happened?”), only the nominative marker is felicitous 
on the subject in both languages (ex. 1a, # denotes infelicity). In contrast, in a context where 
one entity is topical, use of the topic marker on that entity is more natural (ex. 1b, ? indicates 
that the usage is awkward). Both –wa and –(n)un can also have more nuanced interpretations 
(e.g. can be used to mark contrastive topics),[20] depending on their position and the 
information-structural properties of the rest of the sentence.[21]
(1a) What happened?
{Sumi-ka / #Sumi-nun} apa [Korean]
{Sumi-NOM / #Sumi-TOP} sick
‘Sumi is sick.’ (with NOM) or ‘As for Sumi, she’s sick.’ (with TOP)
(1b) What happened to Sumi?/Why didn’t Sumi come?’
{Sumi-nun /?Sumi-ka} apa [Korean]
{Sumi-TOP/ Sumi-NOM} sick
Other languages, such as the Mayan language Tzotzil, also use morphological means to 
mark topics. Topic phrases in Tzotzil begin with the particle a and end with the enclitic –e.
[22] There are also languages that use morphology to mark the focused, new-information 
elements rather than topical elements (e.g. in West African language groups such Gur, Kwa, 
and Chadic).[23] Even languages that are not commonly thought of as having morphological 
topic markers show indications of morphology being sensitive to information structure. For 
example, in Russian, the object of a negative sentence (e.g. ‘letter’) is marked with 
accusative case when the letter is known to exist (‘He did not receive letter-ACC’ means he 
did not receive the letter), and with genitive case when the existence of the letter is not 
known/not presupposed (‘He did not receive letter-GEN’ means he did not receive any 
letter).[24] Related patterns exist in Finnish.[25]
Verb morphology—Some languages mark the information status of arguments with 
verbal morphology, in what is called an Inverse system. On transitive verbs, verbal 
inflections indicate which argument is ‘proximate’ (i.e., topical and/or given), and which is 
‘obviative’ (less topical). This is similar to the function of the passive in English, in that the 
inverse verbal morphology indicates that Actor argument is less topical than the other 
argument. For example, in the language of the Mapuche people of Chile, ‘I’ and ‘you’ are 
assumed to be more topical than 3rd person arguments, so the sentence meaning She saw me 
is required to take the Inverse morphology, resulting in a sentence more like I was seen by 
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her.[26] Inverse systems have also been reported for Algonquian, Cherokee, and other 
languages.[27]
Other focus markers—The effects of information structure are also evident in the use of 
focus particles such as only and even.[28] While some focus particles are separate words 
(e.g. English only, too, German nur ‘only’, auch ‘too’), they can also be clitics that attach to 
other constituents (e.g. Finnish –kin ‘too’, Japanese -mo ‘too’). The effect that these 
expressions have on the meaning of a sentence crucially depends on the information-
structural properties of the sentence: Consider a sentence with only, such as John only saw 
the dog. If saw is the new information, then the sentence means that John only SAW the 
dog, but didn’t pet it or walk it. But if the dog is the new information, the sentence means 
that John only saw the DOG, and not anything else (see also the section on prosody, below).
Word order variation
The effects of information structure extend to variation in word order or constituent order. 
For example, a single event might be described in numerous ways, as shown in (2). (See 
[31] for more discussion of different constructions in English.)
(2)
a Active: The cat swiped the dog on the nose.
b Passive: The dog was swiped on the nose by the cat.
c Heavy-NP-shifted: The cat swiped on the nose the dog that had 
frightened it.
d Topicalization: The DOG the cat swiped on the nose, while the ferret 
got away.
d Prepositional Dative: The cat gave a warning to the dog.
e Double object Dative: The cat gave the dog a warning.
f Clefting: It was the dog that the cat swiped on the nose
It is widely argued that a function of word order variation is to mark information structure, 
following the broad generalization that given or more accessible information precedes new 
or less accessible information.[1,6,29]. A related effect is the tendency to put long and 
complex phrases later in the utterance, and relatively shorter ones earlier (ex. 2c).[30] These 
two patterns are not independent, because short phrases tend to refer to given and topical 
information. Nevertheless, there is evidence that phrase complexity and information 
structure have independent effects on word order.[47]
The examples in (2) come from English, which has relatively limited word order variation, 
and most of the variation comes from non-canonical word orders.[31] Many other languages 
– including Finnish, Japanese, Korean, German, Turkish, Mayan languages and West 
African languages – allow even freer variation of word order. Similar to English, word order 
reflects information packaging, generally following a given-new order. For example, in 
Finnish, subjects canonically precede objects, but objects can occur before subjects when 
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they have already been mentioned in the preceding discourse (ex. 3)[32]. Word order can 
also be used to mark focus similar to clefts in English (e.g. Finnish OSV and SOV order, ex. 
3(c)).
(3)
a. What did Esa read?
Esa luki kirjan (Finnish: SVO)
Esa-NOM read book-ACC
‘Esa read a book.’
b. Who read the book?
Kirjan luki Esa (Finnish: OVS)
Book-ACC luki Esa-NOM
‘Esa read the book.’ / ‘The book was read by Esa.’
c.
Kirjan Esa luki (Finnish: OSV)
Book-ACC Esa-NOM read
‘It was the book that Esa read.’
Prosody and Intonation
In languages like English, information structure is reflected in the prosody of speech. 
Prosody includes syllable stress and intonational phrasing, and the rhythmic structure of an 
utterance. A subpart of prosody, intonation, operates independently of rhythmic prosody, 
and marks the information or focus structure of a sentence. The intonational structure of an 
utterance determines which words receive accents, i.e. which words sound more acoustically 
prominent. Accents are commonly realized with pitch excursions, and greater duration and 
amplitude. Intonational accent makes the difference between the two otherwise identical 
sentences shown in (4), where capitals denote accented words.
(4a) She had a pet RAT.
(4b) She had a PET rat.
Accenting signifies information status categories such as focus, contrastiveness, and 
givenness/newness.[33] Focus refers to the marking of constituents in an utterance that 
constitute news, or contribute to the speaker’s conversational goals.[34] Example (4) shows 
how focus can differentially highlight information in an utterance. (4a) appropriately 
answers a question like “Did she have any pets?” while (4b) might occur after “Did she have 
any rats?” Focus need not refer to explicit questions.
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Accents can also mark the contrastive element of a set of entities,[35] as in (5):
(5a) No, not the GREEN lizard, the BROWN one.
(5b) No, not the green LIZARD, the green SNAKE.
In 5a, the speaker refers to the brown lizard particularly as contrasted with the green, 
focusing on the color. In 5b, the accent instead marks the contrast between two comparable 
animals, focusing on the different reptiles. Focus and contrast often overlap, as in this 
example, where the accent reflects informational focus on one piece of contrastive 
information.
Finally, accent often marks the difference between given and new information, which tend 
to be deaccented and accented respectively, as in (6):
(6) We had a FERRET before we bought our CORGI. The ferret (GIVEN) was 
surprisingly friendly. Then we bought a CAT (NEW).
As with contrast, focus plays a core role in the relationship between accent and givenness/
newness.[36]
There is substantial empirical evidence that speakers and listeners are sensitive to the 
functions of intonation. Speakers modulate prosody based on the information status of their 
words, using acoustic reduction (i.e. shorter, unaccented, and less intelligible 
pronunciations) for previously-mentioned words or entities,[37]. Similarly, listeners are 
faster to interpret references to given information if the word is unaccented.[38] However, 
the precise acoustics of accenting and deaccenting are not yet fully understood, and further 
research is needed to understand how speech reflects the linguistic categories of information 
status.
THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO EXPLAINING INFORMATION 
STRUCTURAL EFFECTS IN LANGUAGE
As described above, linguistic form is highly sensitive to information status. Why does this 
occur? Researchers have offered numerous types of explanations, from pragmatic rules 
about linguistic form, to cognitive mechanisms underlying language use. Here we review a 
number of these approaches.
The first section (referred to here as the linguistic system approach) describes theories that 
focus on the nature of the information itself. One subset of this research tradition focuses on 
the role that information plays within a particular discourse or sentence. Is it topical? Is the 
speaker choosing to highlight that information? Another subset focuses on whether the 
knowledge is known or familiar. This knowledge state could be construed as the speaker’s 
knowledge, listener’s knowledge, or both.
The second section (termed here the social/communicative approach) describes two very 
different theoretical approaches that consider how linguistic form variation serves the goal 
of communication. The common ground approach examines how discourse participants keep 
track of both their own knowledge state and that of their interlocutors, and how this guides 
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language use. The optimal systems approach also focuses on effective communication, but 
instead accounts for a very different dimension of information – i.e., the ability for linguistic 
forms to carry more or less information, quantitatively speaking.
Information status as part of the linguistic system
The most widely accepted notion of information structure is as a set of rules or constraints 
that determine linguistic form, in whole or part. Under this view, a key aim of research in 
this area is to identify which information-structural categories are relevant and how they 
influence choice of linguistic form. This encompasses formal approaches, in which 
information structure is either part of the grammar, or at the grammar/pragmatics interface, 
as well as functional approaches in which cognitive representations guide linguistic form.
Categorical approaches—One tradition has described how linguistic systems are 
constrained by binary (or sometimes three-way) distinctions in information status. Broadly 
speaking, this approach has received considerable attention within theoretical linguistics, 
where researchers argue for different types of information-structural divisions (e.g. topic-
comment;[39,40] topic-focus;[41] focuspresupposition;[ 42, 43] rheme-theme;[1] open 
proposition-focus;[44] see also [45] for a tripartite division). These approaches are united by 
the insight that one part of every utterance connects to something that the listener already 
knows, and another part provides new information about this known entity or event. For 
example, consider the discourse The little brown worm wiggled under the lettuce. A few 
moments later, he emerged from the ground for his dinner. The pronoun he refers to the 
worm, which has been previously mentioned and can be considered the topic of this 
discourse fragment. The new information [emerged from the ground] can be considered the 
focus. The information-structural divisions in sentences can also be seen with clefts, e.g. It 
was arugula that he ate. Here, ‘arugula’ is new, focused information while [he ate 
something] is what the sentence is about, which here can be regarded as a presupposition or 
open proposition. Thus, a key part of comprehension is that hearers need to identify what the 
topic is (i.e. intuitively, what the sentence is about), and to add the new information about 
the topic to their mental discourse model.
Gradient representations of information status—While theoretical linguistics has 
mostly favored categorical descriptions of information status categories (see section below 
on future directions), the functional linguistics literature has proposed gradient descriptions 
of information status. This view seems to be required by phenomena like variations in 
referential expressions, which fall along a hierarchy of specificity, ranging from unstressed 
pronouns to highly specific expressions like that squirrel that got into the screen porch and 
stole our crackers last year (see section above on reference). This variation has been 
proposed to result from the referent’s status along a continuum such as salience, 
prominence, or accessibility.[3, 10, 11,12,13] Givon[46] characterizes information along a 
continuum of topicality that is very similar to what other researchers call accessibility. Note 
that some researchers use the term focus or focus of attention to identify the element that is 
most salient in the discourse; but this use of the term has more in common with the linguistic 
term “topic” than “focus”. Recency of mention is assumed to make information salient, as 
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well as prominent syntactic positions, like subject or topic position. Representations of 
accessibility also account for preferences in word order[47] and accenting.[38]
Givenness and topicality are also related to predictability.[12] Discourses tend to be 
thematically organized, so information that has already been mentioned is likely to be 
mentioned again. This makes the words themselves predictable, but it also makes references 
to the information itself predictable, regardless of what words are used.[48] Prince[4] even 
offers one definition of givenness based on the speaker’s assumption of what is predictable 
to the listener. However, recent work has yielded mixed results about whether the speakers’ 
choices of referring expressions, e.g. pronouns vs. names, are related to referential 
predictability. While some studies find that they do (12, 49), others find that they do not,
[50],[51] see also [52].
Information status reflects the social/communicative function of language
The common ground approach—There is broad consensus that information status is 
relevant to language use because it serves a social function. As Grice[53] famously argued, 
speakers design their utterances to meet the demands of successful communication. For 
example, he suggests that speakers follow the maxim of Quantity, which is to say as much 
as required but not more. The information already established in context helps determine 
how much is required. This generalization fits well with the cross-linguistic tendency for 
speakers to produce more specific referential expressions when information is not 
predictable from the context. On this view, information packaging results from a language 
convention: speakers may order given information before new as a result of a social 
“contract”[8] with listeners.
The social/communicative view of information packaging critically depends on the idea that 
speakers and listeners keep track of what information is mutually known, or in common 
ground.[54] Common ground can include a social or cultural background, a linguistic or 
environmental domain, and expectations about the course of the conversation. For example, 
common ground helps conversational partners understand that when a speaker says The 
capybara is adorable, he means the capybara known in the conversation and not some other. 
Similarly, Prince[55] distinguishes discourse-givenness from hearer-givenness.
Speakers draw on common ground for the process of audience design, whereby they choose 
linguistic forms that fit the knowledge and attentional state of their interlocutors. For 
example, conversation partners tend to establish shared terms of reference, and switching 
partners can lead to decreased efficiency.[56] Speakers include necessary modifiers (e.g. 
‘small square’ in the context of squares of different sizes), assuming they have noticed the 
referential contrast.[57] Listeners also keep track of what information is shared with the 
speaker, and are faster to understand references like the red triangle when there is a single 
red triangle in common ground,[58] and watch the speaker’s visual focus of attention to help 
interpret ambiguous definite descriptions like the circle in the presence of multiple circles.
[59]
On the other hand, the effects of common ground on language production and 
comprehension are somewhat limited. Some researchers have suggested that, at least in 
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some situations, speakers default to their own perspective when planning or executing 
utterances.[60] Listeners, too, sometimes consider objects in privileged ground as potential 
referents, even though the speaker is unaware of the object’s presence.[61]
Thus, representations of information status must include the speaker and listener’s 
knowledge about what information is in common ground, and what is not. However, given 
the mixed findings in this area, common ground does not offer a simple mechanism for 
defining information structure. Speakers track the knowledge and intentional state of their 
interlocutor, but it appears to influence only some linguistic processes, and not others.
The optimal system approach—Another approach to understanding how information 
affects speech relies on the argument that in a noisy communication channel like natural 
speech, the most efficient way to maximize information transfer is to maintain uniform 
information transmission over time.[62] This means that when the context makes 
information expected or predictable, speakers should tend to reduce the linguistic forms that 
encode this information. By contrast, they should encode less predictable information with 
more explicit pronunciations, lexical, and/or syntactic choices. Recent information density 
proposals hold that speech reflects this rational organization,[63] and that comprehenders 
use an analogous information-based method, although neither speakers nor comprehenders 
necessarily make these calculations consciously. On this view, information status has a 
mathematical definition. A word’s information is defined as the negative logarithm-
transformed frequency of that word out of context . 
This measures how much uncertainty reduction (i.e. information) a word carries.
This approach accounts for a wide variety of empirical phenomena. For example, speakers 
lengthen words that are relatively unpredictable in context (i.e. that carry more information), 
and reduce the overall clarity of predictable words.[64] At the word level, optional that (e.g., 
She knew that her horse won vs. She knew her horse won) occurs more often when 
information density is high, i.e. when the word is less predictable in context.[65] More 
abstractly, speakers increase the informational contribution of sentences as a discourse 
unfolds.[66] In comprehension, too, words that create less surprisal (the inverse of 
uncertainty reduction) cause less processing difficulty, suggesting that readers and listeners 
track information density.[67,68]
FUTURE DIRECTIONS: REPRESENTING INFORMATION STATUS 
PSYCHOLOGICALLY
There is broad agreement amongst researchers that language form varies as a function of 
information status and information structure. But the theoretical views outlined above 
demonstrate that there is still substantial variation in the dimension of information that is 
deemed relevant. There has also been little systematic research on the relation between these 
different approaches. We argue that a promising next step for the field is to examine the 
psychological mechanisms by which information status is represented and used. This is the 
focus of ongoing research. Here we identify some of the assumptions that stem from the 
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theoretical approaches outlined above, review existing proposals about processing 
mechanisms, and identify questions that require further attention.
The prototypical treatment of information status carves up utterances into categories like 
given/new or topic/focus. These categories are used to explain why speakers use one 
linguistic form over another, and how comprehenders interpret them. This view seems to 
assume that the processing system includes an explicit representation of information status 
that is available to the linguistic processes governing word order, intonation, reference form 
choices, and other information-structure phenomena, as well as a mechanism for selecting 
the right form. Yet there are many open questions about both 1) the representation of 
information status and 2) the mechanisms by which information status affects language 
form.
How is information status represented?
Information status as a nonlinguistic representation—One possibility is that 
information status is represented nonlinguistically in the minds of the discourse participants. 
Many models assume that discourse participants maintain a mental model of the current 
situation, which also includes information-status tags[69], or gradient representations of 
discourse salience.[70]
Another possibility is that our mental representations do not specifically assign information 
status tags, but rather that information status emerges naturally out of human memory and 
attentional systems (see also [71] on the relation between linguistic and non-linguistic 
representations). Theories of memory distinguish between working memory, which stores 
information currently under use, and longer-term memory, which stores conceptual and 
procedural knowledge for later use. We might define “given” information as information in 
working memory, while “new” is information that has not yet been retrieved from long-term 
memory (see [5] for discussion).
Likewise, gradient distinctions in salience or accessibility may correspond to the amount of 
attention paid. This intuition underlies Gundel et al.’s Givenness hierarchy,[11] which 
suggests that linguistic forms are chosen based on the speaker’s assumption about the 
listener’s attentional state. The relation to attention is similarly embodied in the linguistic 
term “focus of attention” (related to Centering Theory’s Backward-looking Center),
[72]which has been used to explain referential form, word order, and other phenomena.
This emergent view of information representation is consistent with Horton and Gerrig’s[73] 
proposal that common ground representations are a natural consequence of the way memory 
works. They propose that interlocutors automatically and implicitly store associative 
information about the conversation (for example, who introduced a particular referent), in 
the same way they store information outside of linguistic contexts. On this account, speakers 
then draw on these associations to make their conversational contributions appropriate. This 
allows them to rely on their own knowledge and ease of processing, even in non-
communicative tasks.
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More research is needed to understand how representations of information change 
dynamically over time, and based on the context. The optimal systems approach (described 
above) defines information in terms of the probability of word, referent, or structure. This 
probability, in principle, must be calculated within a particular context. This account leads to 
important questions about how detailed the calculation of probability is, what information is 
included and at what level of granularity, and how quickly it is calculated and updated.
Information status as a linguistic representation—Another question is whether 
information status is represented explicitly in the syntactic structure (see [2] for discussion). 
This question is posed by the theoretical approach to syntax known as the Cartographic 
approach[74, 75]. One of the basic aims of this work is to investigate what is encoded in the 
grammar: “Of the properties which enter into human thought and belief systems, which ones 
are represented as grammatical features?” ([74], p. 424). If sentences have topics and foci, 
are these properties also represented as grammatical features in the syntactic representation 
of sentences? According to Rizzi[76] and others, the answer is yes. On this view, particular 
linguistic elements are ‘flagged’ with different information structural features, and need to 
find their way to the correct syntactic position in order to ‘satisfy’ the information-structural 
feature that they carry. A large body of fine-grained, crosslinguistic work has been 
conducted within the Cartographic approach, allowing researchers to identify crosslinguistic 
generalizations as well as differences.
Mechanisms for using information status
Information as selectional criteria—Information structure is typically used as an 
explanation for why one linguistic form is preferred over another. As such, information 
structure represents the conditioning context, and linguistic forms are chosen on the basis of 
grammatical or pragmatic rules that specify this relation. This is the view represented by the 
Cartographic approach, above, as well as other pragmatic and grammatical approaches to 
information structure. More work is needed to develop psycholinguistic models of these 
processes.
Information effects via processing facilitation—Another possibility is that 
information structure is relevant because it has consequences for the psycholinguistic 
processes underlying language production and comprehension. Information that is given, 
attended, predictable and topical is typically easier to process than information that is new 
and unattended. For example, when information has a strong memory representation and/or 
is attended to, it should be easy to retrieve. It has been proposed that this facilitates the 
reactivation of this information during both language production and comprehension, and 
that affects linguistic behaviour directly.
One such proposal is that syntactic choices reflect the ease of producing different elements 
in the utterance.[77] Speakers tend to choose syntactic constructions that allow them to put 
accessible information early in an utterance, possibly because it allows them to postpone the 
difficult part of the utterance, which needs further planning time.[47].This view is supported 
by evidence that speakers choose word orders as a function of their own visual attention.[78] 
A related proposal is that speakers produce acoustically reduced forms for repeated words 
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because the production of given information is facilitated.[79] Related to this, 
comprehenders’ recall and ease of processing linguistic stimuli is influenced by focus-
marking devices such as clefts[80] and pitch accents.[81]
Information distribution: Information-theoretic accounts of linguistic variation, described 
in the section on optimal systems, suggest that linguistic forms are chosen so as to create a 
smooth distribution of information. A transparent application of this literature would suggest 
that the language production system has a monitoring system that identifies the amount of 
information in a particular idea, and selects linguistic forms that distribute it evenly. Such a 
mechanism might draw directly on the representations proposed by other research traditions 
to quantify information (e.g., topic/focus, given/new, addressee knowledge, etc). 
Alternatively, these effects may be the result of numerous separate mechanisms such as the 
ones described above.
Conclusion
The relationship between information status and linguistic form is complex. There are many 
linguistic phenomena that are sensitive to informational considerations, yet there is no single 
theory of information status representations that captures them all. One reason for this is that 
different linguistic phenomena seem to pick out different categories of information. As we 
described above, different languages encode information status with reference, word order, 
morphological marking, prosody, and other linguistic phenomena. Some of these seem to 
require categorical divisions between topic and focus, or given and new. Yet others seem to 
require gradient representations of topicality or predictability.
Part of the heterogeneity in how languages encode information status may stem from the 
breadth of what we might call “information”. We can think of information as a property of 
things in the world, such that some information is either inherently more salient, or more 
salient than other information in the context. Alternatively, we could think of information as 
a property of how entities and events in the world are represented psychologically, such that 
some information has stronger, more detailed, or more accessible representations. Other 
approaches view information structure as an emergent part of social interaction, for example 
the notion that “given” and “new” are defined with respect to common ground and/or 
communication over a noisy signal. A goal of future work is to identify how these 
characterizations relate to each other and to variation in linguistic form.
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